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No. 90-7099 
District Court 
Civil Action No. 
84-3040 
MOTION TO STRI-KE THE BRIEF OF THE EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AS AMICUS CURIAE 
Appellant Price Waterhouse hereby requests that this 
Court strike the Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission as Arnicus Curiae, which was filed in this Court on 
August 10, 1990. Price Waterhouse requests that the Motion be 
granted for the reasons set forth below. 
1. The District Court issued its opinion in this 
case on May 14, 1990, and entered final judgment on May 25, 
1990. Price Waterhouse timely filed its Notice of Appeal on 
June 21, 1990, and on June 29, 1990, this Court expedited the 
appeal. Price Waterhouse timely filed its opening brief on 
July 18, 1990, and plaintiff timely filed her brief on August 
8, 1990. Oral argument is scheduled for September 7, 1990. 
2. On August 10, 1990, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed a brief amicus curiae in 
support of plaintiff in this case. Notwithstanding that Price 
Waterhouse's Reply Brief was due to be filed under the 
expedited briefing schedule on August 15, 1990, the EEOC did 
not notify Price Waterhouse of its intent to file an amicus 
brief until the afternoon before it filed that brief, August 9, 
1990. 
3. Prior t~ the filing of its amicus brief, the EEOC 
had not sought to participate in this case in any court during 
the six-year history of this litigation. It did not 
participate as an amicus in the District Court in 1985, in this 
Court in 1987, in the Supreme Court in 1989, or in the District 
Court on remand in 1990. 
4. There is simply no good cause or reasonable 
excuse for the EEOC's belated attempt to participate in this 
case. Cf. General Rules of the D.C. Circuit, Rule ll(e). The 
EEOC could have and should have notified the parties and this 
Court of its intent to file an amicus brief at an earlier point 
in these proceedings so that a date for the filing of such 
brief could have been worked into the expedited briefing 
schedule, pursuant to the usual practice of this Court. The 
EEOC's failure to give such notice deprived Price Waterhouse of 
a meaningful opportunity to determine whether and how to 
respond to the merits of the EEOC's brief amicus curiae. The 
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amicus brief should therefore be stricken. Compare California 
Public Broadcasting Forum v. ~, 752 F.2d 670 (o.c. Cir. 1985) 
(striking intervenor's brief for failure to give adequate 
notice). 
5. Rule ll(e) of the Rules of this Court provides 
that a brief amicus curiae "shall avoid repetition of facts or 
legal arguments ... and shall focus on points not made or 
adequately elaborated upon in the principal brief" of the party 
whom the amicus supports. The EEOC's brief does not conform to 
these requirements. 
6. Indeed, a full one-third of the EEOC's brief 
consists of a "Statement of the Case," in which the EEOC 
repeats, distorts, and mischaracterizes the record in this case 
and the findings of the court below. EEOC's Br. at 3-9. For 
example, the EEOC repeatedly states that the District Court 
found that unconscious sex stereotyping "permeated" the process 
that led to the deferral of plaintiff's partnership candidacy, 
and suggests that the court actually found that stereotyping 
"affect[ed] not only those criticisms that were overtly sexist 
but also some that were couched in neutral terms." EEOC's 
Br. at 9, 12, 14. However, the District Court found only that 
sex stereotyping played an "undefined role" in the process (618 
F. Supp. 1109, 1114 (D.D.C. 1985)), and it was never proven 
that these concededly non-pretextual, gender-neutral criticisms 
of plaintiff's interpersonal skills were in fact tainted in any 
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way by sex stereotyping. ~ Appellant's Br. at 20; Reply Br. 
at 2-3. 
Similarly, the EEOC erroneously assumes that none of 
the partners who criticized plaintiff's interpersonal skills 
testified at trial, and, based upon that assumption, asserts 
that "Price Waterhouse could not rely on facially neutral 
criticisms" without providing "some evidence" that the partners 
were not motivated by discriminatory animus. EEOC's Br. at 
14-15. But the EEOC ~as simply misread the record. For 
example, two partners who worked closely with plaintiff and 
voiced strong criticisms of plaintiff's interpersonal skills 
during the partner selection process testified in 1985 in great 
detail as to the nondiscriminatory bases of these criticisms. 
See Appellant's Br. at 15-16 & n.3. There was no suggestion 
that these partners were motivated by any unstated 
d . 
. . t . 1/ 1scr1m1na ory animus.-
The EEOC also appears completely unaware of the 
substantial evidence in the record that plaintiff's 
interpersonal skills were criticized in several annual 
1/ In addition, the EEOC states that "a number of partners 
opposed Hopkins' candidacy" and "[s]ome of these partner made 
critical comments .•. which were couched in terms of sex." 
EEOC's Br. at 3-4. But only one "opponent" of plaintiff's 
candidacy commented in language that has been identified in 
this litigation as gender-related. Compare Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1987), with App. at 
37-49. 
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performance reviews "well before plaintiff was proposed for 
partnership." 618 F. Supp. at 1114. "At the time, plaintiff 
indicated that she agreed with many of these criticisms," which 
also "formed the basis of the Policy Board's decision" to defer 
plaintiff's partnership candidacy. Id. 
The EEOC's description of the District Court's 
remedial holdings suffers from similar factual inaccuracy and 
incompleteness. For example, the EEOC asserts that the court 
below concluded that reconsideration of plaintiff for partner 
was not an adequate remedy because "it was clear from the 
evidence that [Price Waterhouse] would not voluntarily admit 
her to the partnership." EEOC Br. at 9. There is no such 
evidence in the record. Rather, what is "clear from the 
evidence" is that plaintiff's "fail[ure] to work at her 
calling, at a level available to her," Findings, App. at 
242-44, since she left Price Waterhouse in 1984 calls into 
question her qualifications to function as a Price Waterhouse 
partner today. See 1990 Tr. at 247-48; Tr. of May 25, 1990 
Hearing at 1-3. 
7. The EEOC's legal arguments (Br. at 12-24) are 
substantially predicated on and intertwined with these 
erroneous factual assumptions. Moreover, the EEOC addresses 
precisely the same legal issues as plaintiff's brief, repeats 
plaintiff's arguments without any substantial elaboration, and 
does not in any significant way bring to bear its purported 
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expertise on the questions presented to this Court by 
appellant. The EEOC's brief amicus curiae thus does not meet 
the requirements of Rule ll(e). 
WHEREFORE, Price Waterhouse respectfully requests that 
the EEOC's brief amicus curiae brief be stricken.Z/ 
Dated: August 15, 1990 Respectfully submitted, 
--.A-:1 Theodore B. Olson 
}P (D.C. Bar No. 367456) 
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. 
(D.C. Bar No. 420440) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 
1050 Connecticut Ave., N. W. 
Suite 900 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 955-8500 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Price Waterhouse 
ZI Price Waterhouse has, simultaneous with the filing of this 
Motion, filed a motion requesting that it be permitted to 
submit a supplemental brief addressing the EEOC's amicus brief, 
to be filed no later than August 24, 1990, should the Court 
deny this Motion. Given that this case is to be heard on 
September 7, 1990, and in order to ensure that the Court has 
sufficient time to consider such a supplemental brief prior to 
oral argument, Price Waterhouse also requests that the Court 
direct that any response to this Motion to Strike be filed by 
August 20, 1990. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing 
Motion to Strike the Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission as Amicus Curiae to be served by hand delivery this 
15th day of August 1990 upon James H. Heller, Esq., Kator, 
Scott & Heller, 1275 K Street, N.W., Suite 950, Washington, 
D.C. 20006, and Susan L.P. Starr, Esq., Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, 1801 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 
20507. 
~~B1.f~t. 
(D.C. Bar No. 420440) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 
1050 Connecticut Ave., N. w. 
Suite 900 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 955-8500 
